Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
A Review.
the resignation of Lord Palmerston , which had just occurred , was due to an influence behind the throne . " How the Queen and the Prince felt under these attacks is indicated in a letter which the Prince wrote to Baron Stockmar , in which he says : —
" Victoria has taken the whole affair oreatly to heart , and was excessively indignant at the attacks . Finally , if our courage and cheerfulness have not suffered our stomachs and digestions have , as they commonly do where the feelings are kept
long upon the stretch . Since yesterday I have been quite miserable . To-clay I have had to keep to the house , and this is why you get this long letter . "
When Parliament met tho Prince was vindicated by the benches both of Minister and Opposition , and the Queen , writing to Baron Stockmar subsequently , says : — " I write to you in the fulness of joy at the triumphant refutation of all the
calumnies in the two Houses of Parliament last night . The position of my beloved lord and master had been defined for once and all , and his merits have been acknowledged on all sides most duly . There was an immense concourse of people assembled when we went to the House of Lords , and the people were very friendly . "
Ihe Prince wrote a memorandum to Lord Aberdeen in October , 1 S 43 , when the Eastern Question was engaging the attention of England and all Europe , and which contained truths which statesmen and others may well ponder over to-day .
The question is involved in the Oriental dispute and the motives which have guided and ought to guide the conduct of the European Powers , and of England in particular , are so complicated and interwoven that it is very desirable to separate and define them before we can
jud ge of what will be the future line of action on our part . When Prince Menschakoff had obtained the concessions which , in our opinion , Russia was entitled to demand , and made new demands not borne out b treatywe declared these
y any , demands unjust and untenable , and l iirkey in the right in refusing compliance with them . When Russia invaded ^ Princi palities , for the avowed purpose ° t holding a pledge in hand by which to
coerce Turkey into compliance , we declared this an infraction of international law and an act of unjustifiable aggression upon Turkey , and justify ing the latter in going to war . We advised her , however , at the same time , to remain at peace . We
took upon ourselves the task of obtaining from Russia by our negotiations a diplomatic settlement of the dispute , not involving the concessions which we had said Turkey ought not to make , and securing the evacuation of the Principalities .
These negotiations have hitherto been unattended with success . We have in the meantime sent orders to our fleet to protect and defend the Turkish territory from any Russian attack . Throughout the transaction there we have taken distinctly the part of Turkey as against Russia . The motives which have guided us have been mainly three : —
1 . We considered Turkey in the right and Russia in the wrong , and could not see without indignation that unprovoked attempt of a strong Power to oppress a weak one .
2 . We felt the paramount importance of not allowing Russia to obtain in an underhand way or by a legal form , a hold over Turkey which she would not have ventured to seek by open conquest .
3 . We were most anxious for the preservation of the peace of Europe , which could not fail to be endangered by open hostilities between Turkey and Russia . These motives must be pronounced just and laudableand ought still to guide our
, conduct . By the order to our fleet , however , to protect the Turkish territory , and by the declaration of war now issued by the Turks , the third , and perhaps most important object of our policy has been decidedly placed in jeopardy . In acting
as auxiliaries to the Turks we ought to be quite sure that they have no object in view foreign to our duty and 'interests , that they do not drive at war whilst we aim at peace , that they do not , instead of merely resisting the attempt of Russia to
obtain a protectorate over the Greek population incompatible with their own independence , seek to obtain themselves the power of imposing a more oppressive rule of two millions of fauatic Mussulmans over twelve millions of Christians , that they do
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
A Review.
the resignation of Lord Palmerston , which had just occurred , was due to an influence behind the throne . " How the Queen and the Prince felt under these attacks is indicated in a letter which the Prince wrote to Baron Stockmar , in which he says : —
" Victoria has taken the whole affair oreatly to heart , and was excessively indignant at the attacks . Finally , if our courage and cheerfulness have not suffered our stomachs and digestions have , as they commonly do where the feelings are kept
long upon the stretch . Since yesterday I have been quite miserable . To-clay I have had to keep to the house , and this is why you get this long letter . "
When Parliament met tho Prince was vindicated by the benches both of Minister and Opposition , and the Queen , writing to Baron Stockmar subsequently , says : — " I write to you in the fulness of joy at the triumphant refutation of all the
calumnies in the two Houses of Parliament last night . The position of my beloved lord and master had been defined for once and all , and his merits have been acknowledged on all sides most duly . There was an immense concourse of people assembled when we went to the House of Lords , and the people were very friendly . "
Ihe Prince wrote a memorandum to Lord Aberdeen in October , 1 S 43 , when the Eastern Question was engaging the attention of England and all Europe , and which contained truths which statesmen and others may well ponder over to-day .
The question is involved in the Oriental dispute and the motives which have guided and ought to guide the conduct of the European Powers , and of England in particular , are so complicated and interwoven that it is very desirable to separate and define them before we can
jud ge of what will be the future line of action on our part . When Prince Menschakoff had obtained the concessions which , in our opinion , Russia was entitled to demand , and made new demands not borne out b treatywe declared these
y any , demands unjust and untenable , and l iirkey in the right in refusing compliance with them . When Russia invaded ^ Princi palities , for the avowed purpose ° t holding a pledge in hand by which to
coerce Turkey into compliance , we declared this an infraction of international law and an act of unjustifiable aggression upon Turkey , and justify ing the latter in going to war . We advised her , however , at the same time , to remain at peace . We
took upon ourselves the task of obtaining from Russia by our negotiations a diplomatic settlement of the dispute , not involving the concessions which we had said Turkey ought not to make , and securing the evacuation of the Principalities .
These negotiations have hitherto been unattended with success . We have in the meantime sent orders to our fleet to protect and defend the Turkish territory from any Russian attack . Throughout the transaction there we have taken distinctly the part of Turkey as against Russia . The motives which have guided us have been mainly three : —
1 . We considered Turkey in the right and Russia in the wrong , and could not see without indignation that unprovoked attempt of a strong Power to oppress a weak one .
2 . We felt the paramount importance of not allowing Russia to obtain in an underhand way or by a legal form , a hold over Turkey which she would not have ventured to seek by open conquest .
3 . We were most anxious for the preservation of the peace of Europe , which could not fail to be endangered by open hostilities between Turkey and Russia . These motives must be pronounced just and laudableand ought still to guide our
, conduct . By the order to our fleet , however , to protect the Turkish territory , and by the declaration of war now issued by the Turks , the third , and perhaps most important object of our policy has been decidedly placed in jeopardy . In acting
as auxiliaries to the Turks we ought to be quite sure that they have no object in view foreign to our duty and 'interests , that they do not drive at war whilst we aim at peace , that they do not , instead of merely resisting the attempt of Russia to
obtain a protectorate over the Greek population incompatible with their own independence , seek to obtain themselves the power of imposing a more oppressive rule of two millions of fauatic Mussulmans over twelve millions of Christians , that they do